Liberty, Constraints, and Contradictions: How to Better Chain the Leviathan

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James Buchanan felt we had yet to balance government power and individual autonomy in a way that maximizes human liberty and flourishing. Liberalism is a political theory and movement that has come closest to attaining Buchanan’s Balance. Still, problems in its theoretical foundations lead to an unruly centralized government at the cost of the individual. I argue that implementing a polycentric approach, focusing on cultural institutions, and recentering necessary political violence can close gaps in modern liberal theory and improve governance in liberal societies. 

Liberalism:

The liberal tradition stems from the social construct theorists in the 17th-18th century, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke, who each conceived of the state of nature before society is given structure from social institutions to regulate the behavior of individuals. The Hobbsian state of nature envisioned a brutal landscape of individuals holding equal power and thus having no means of settling conflict other than through violence. To create peace and order the people must grant their sovereignty to a central government, what Hobbes termed, and Buchanan referenced, the Leviathan. Rousseau followed similar thinking but the main departure was the emphasis that the central governing body must be through a majoritarian vote. Locke helped form much of what developed into modern liberalism, including the importance of civic consent in forming governing institutions, property rights, and the sovereignty of individuals. 

Stemming from social contract theory, the United States of America was formed in a liberal tradition. The Federalist Papers influenced this construction. Besides defending the rights and freedoms of individuals, the Federalist Papers made important practical arguments on how to enshrine those values and constrain the central government from misusing its power. Particularly, the separation of powers, dividing the roles of the central government so that each body may act as a check on the other, and the use of a constitution that maintains the rights of individuals and constrains the government to its proper size, role, and function.

Building on this history modern liberalism began to take form. Major Proponents include Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and James Buchanan who agreed that the Constitution was the greatest means so far of solving Buchanan’s Balance. However, their intellectual work as liberals largely warned against increasing departures from this system they were praising and it has only become worse since their passing.

Failures of Liberalism:

Liberalism has been undergoing a slow death in modern times. Like the ship of Theseus, we have failed to notice that our liberal democracies (or democratic republics) are no longer what they once were, despite sharing a similar look and feel, they have been altered piece by piece. 

The Federalist Papers argued the importance of the separation of powers but still argued for a greater centralization than was originally preferred by federalists. Federalism originally referred to those who believed in separate states contracting together under one constitution where states remain empowered and largely independent. Through propaganda, these original federalists were termed anti-federalists and confederalists. They lost out to the strong centralized body of governance argued for in The Federalist Papers and Article 1 of the United States Constitution sees the Federal government hold enumerated power while the states hold non-enumerated powers.  The anti-federalists argued against the notion the Constitution would be able to constrain such a centralized government. Today, the checks and balances have increasingly proven unable to either check or balance growing state power. 

Democratic backsliding is occurring, largely through strategic election manipulation like gerrymandering and a systemic erosion of checks and balances. As former Congressman Justin Amash has pointed out, the legislative process has increasingly concentrated power in a few key party members, no longer offers amendments on the legislature floors, and gets thousands of pages of bills that they could not possibly read before voting on them. The Supreme Court, previously perceived as a trusted and apolitical institution, has become increasingly politicized.  With increasing political polarization, larger masses of civic populations are left with a government they disagree with and despise. The United States continues to wage wars despite not going through the legitimate congressional authorization required. The United States also has the highest incarceration rates, per capita, in the world. With just these few examples, the United States no longer resembles the liberal democracy envisioned in its founding, its institutions have rotted, and liberty along with them, the state grows and the individual pays the price.

Public choice theory scholarship has made clear the incentive structure behind these faults, and from an economic lens, the actions of politicians and the electorate are completely rational. This thought school, in large part built by Buchanan, understands political actors as self-interested cost-benefit maximizing agents. The major findings of the thought school are that voters are rationally uninformed about politics, it is irrational to vote as an individual vote is unlikely to be impactful/decisive, collective action problems see legislatures cater to special interests over the general interest of society, and government departments have the goal of maintaining and growing their budgets rather than solving the problems they were tasked with. It is clear from these findings, and more, that the problems of our liberal democracy are not just due to electing the wrong people, but because of the incentives inherent to its structure. 

Polycentrism:

Part of the problem of containing government is the presupposition that we need a large centralized government in the first place. Instead, polycentrism offers decentralized and alternative governance organizations to achieve the same benefits without the risks of centralized illiberal government. Polycentric scholarship builds a theory on how decentralization and alternative governance structures could operate from observing case studies, showing these conclusions to work in practice. Through polycentrism, we do not need to chain the leviathan: as decentralization occurs we are constraining chihuahuas. 

Poly-centrism is a system of governance that encompasses many interconnected but independent decision-making centers. This system of government is beneficial due to its decentralized nature, particularly for maximizing the ends liberalism aims for while also addressing some of the major concerns referenced above. It more closely resembles confederalism and aligns incentives, addressing the source of many problems following public choice theory, with the structure of the governing institutions in practice.

Polycentrism creates more checks and balances by further decentralizing power and having interconnected institutions check each other. Following a polycentric approach, problems of backsliding in democratic institutions would be weakened due to less concentrations of power extending to lower rent-seeking opportunities, and where they do take place the problems would be local. It avoids polarization as there is more autonomy amongst these powers to establish frameworks that work for specific contexts and populations; by extension there is greater ability for exit, for people to vote with their feet, to live under a system they prefer. Furthermore, it is easier at local levels for voters to be more informed and for their vote to matter more due to localized knowledge and a smaller voter base. There can be better resource management at the local level resulting in economic benefits. These systems also better address important and contentious issues surrounding environmental management and climate change by avoiding the tragedy of the commons and applying ownership to negative externalities typically associated with environmental destruction. This problem is particularly a concern today with climate change creating large public divisions. Liberalism must adapt to these concerns without faltering in favor of large centralized controls. 

Overall, polycentric scholarship is critical of the assumptions that without a central government societies will devolve into chaos, rather people evolve countless and complex non-governmental institutions that mirror the separation of powers and constitutions that liberalism has emphasized. Because of its localized nature, it better addresses the current system’s shortcomings, avoiding the critiques of public choice theory, by aligning incentives. 

Culture:

No matter how comprehensive, masterfully crafted, and composed social institutions and constitutions are, if the society meant to follow them does not value them or the outcomes they promote they will be useless. Cultures shape values and exist before there is formal governance. If a liberal society is the end it must be understood what culture, in theory, would best align people towards this end and how to achieve cultural change. 

The most important cultural institution related to societal construction is morality as it can improve social trust making interactions and transactions less costly, decreasing social cleavages, and aligning governing institutions through shared foundational values. Views on morality shape what individuals can and cannot do in society, justify the use of force and coercion, and set the proper role of government. Despite the importance of moral philosophy, alignment of foundational principles, as seen with public choice theory marrying the liberal economic perspective of human action with political theory, has not taken place. Individuals are self-interested cost-benefit maximizing agents. They are directed towards that which they subjectively value. These assumptions ought to be brought into a moral framework so that a liberal society's theory, in philosophy, politics, and economics is aligned and non-contradictory. 

Morality is the most central and important social institution as it is concerned with the evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of a given action and delineates which ideals are to be strived for based on their assed virtues or vices. In all societies, the means of incentivizing and disincentivizing people's actions are dictated based on where their actions fall in the moral hierarchy of value. This ordering takes place on the scale of the individual and is generalized through social processes into different collectives and entire societies. Highly valued actions, seen as virtues, are highly incentivized, and because of this many social institutions, both private/individual and public/collective, are utilized to help ensure these actions occur. Highly negatively valued actions, seen as vices, are highly disincentivized, and because of this many social institutions, both private/individual and public/collective, are utilized to help ensure these actions do not occur. The lower these actions fall from their extremes the less social regulation that is involved, with the regulation of them becoming increasingly on the level of individual relationships, and the less severe the social sanction/disincentive becomes. Actions deemed irrelevant are left largely unregulated. 

Ethical theories guide the individual, and the societies they form, in how to order actions within this hierarchy of values. An individual's political ideological foundations often map onto certain moral valuations. The moral theory liberals follow is built on the same thinkers who developed the political theory based on shared foundational assumptions. These theorists use a framework of natural or god-given rights to establish virtues and take action against these virtues as vices, some notion of social contractarianism, and/or a framework of nonaggression. They assert these foundational principles as objective measures of morality. There is utility to myth-making when trying to instill one’s moral values in a society, as it makes them more rigid and unquestionable social institutions. However, it may alienate dissenters and make critiquing flawed institutions more difficult. Also, it produces contradictions in liberal theory across subjects.

A culture that embraces a subjective view of morality is best suited for a liberal system. It allows the moral framework to be consistent across subjects and it best maximizes the values liberals hold. Moral subjectivism builds on the work of David Hume and asserts that morality does not stem from reason but rather from emotive judgments. Furthermore, it is impossible to derive moral ought statements from reality, or what is, without a fallacious logical leap.

The reason this is a better moral framework to use in a liberal society is because it is consistent with the economic framework used. Liberal thinkers already commit to a subjective theory of value when it comes to economic goods yet so many make the error of seeing moral values as somehow objective. A culture that embraces subjective morality necessarily follows liberal ideals of tolerance. When one believes another's actions are wrong and objectively so, they will be far more rigid in that belief and unwilling to compromise within a society. Even if the principles being claimed as objective are considered liberal it leads to a rejection of the knowledge problems integral to liberal, economic, theory. The constraints on human knowledge, particularly regarding “truth” values of socially dependent and complex phenomena, mean liberals avoid imposing ideas and values on society. There is no relevant difference between individual subjective values being distilled through the social process into prices and subjective moral values being distilled through the social process into generalized moral “truths” or principles made rigid through social institutions.  However, understanding either emergent phenomena as objective or necessary would be incorrect. While one can objectively observe the price of a good on the shelves, it would be a mistake to believe that value is innate to the economic good or that everyone ought to value the good that much. Similarly, regarding a moral good, one cannot assume that it is innately valuable and that its value is shared and consistent across individuals and time.

There may be a concern that this position leaves liberal morality open to illiberal morals fitting within it due to it coming down to individuals' subjectivity. This position on morality is consistent with other liberal positions, such as freedom of speech extending to illiberal ideas. Because liberals recognize the knowledge constraints and subjectively value coercion negatively, they believe in extending rights and freedoms even to those who peacefully advocate for illiberal ideas due to the differences in their values and the knowledge they hold. Liberals hold that if their ideas are both sound and valued by people in a society they should withstand freely expressed counterarguments.

The way this shift in cultural institutions, such as the moral theory laid out, would take place in practice is a more complicated problem. People's ideological and moral assumptions/foundations are rigid. Whether they stem from religion or long-held cultural norms, shifting such beliefs is not easy but not impossible. Liberal thinkers who established the current mainstream used to be in this challenging position. Through developing sound theory, strong argumentation, and articulation, they engaged in the process of social persuasion and cultural change that led to our current, better but imperfect, liberal system. The goal would be to use the same means they do, making use of modern tools such as social media, to do so again. 

Violence: 

To answer the question of Buchanan’s Balance we must also untangle the seeming contradiction between liberalism and political violence. This is because the implied means of the state to either maximize liberty or threaten it is via coercive violence. I argue that liberal theorists ought to integrate violence into their theorizing so that better strategies for maximizing liberalism are developed. 

Liberal thinkers view violence negatively. Hayek, for example, viewed violence as the worst form of coercion and that for liberalism to flourish any violence and coercion must be restrained through the coercive force of the state, only used for this purpose. This hesitancy towards violence makes sense and is important. Liberalism and democracy together are attempts to navigate and regulate societies full of individuals with deep differences. It is an attempt to avoid settling differences via violent conflict, the de facto method of settling disputes throughout history. 

Despite the reasonable distaste for violence by liberals, violence is inherent to it. Hayek above, as an example of the general liberal position, justifies the Weberian conception of the state as a governing body of a given land with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Therefore, liberals already recognize, through any justification of the state, that there is a legitimate use of violence, and violence can be used to maximize liberty. What is unclear is how they justify granting the government the monopoly on legitimate violence, despite their fears of centralized power and tyranny. 

What has been de-emphasized by liberals is the legitimate use of violence against tyranny as a means of achieving liberal changes to power structures. It was out of violent revolution and resistance that the Constitution of the United States of America was born, the constitution that, as mentioned earlier, is the greatest attempt so far to achieve the balance of power we are discussing. The 2nd Amendment recognizes the importance of the rights of citizens to be armed, not simply so they can defend their homes from a lone thief, but so they could threaten and use violence against a tyrannical state. 

To further this line of thinking, let us consider Hanna Arendt in contrast to Franz Fanon. Arendt praised the democracy of the United States, and from its history argues revolutions must be towards freedom as the end and with constitutional constraints central to the movement. Violence is a destructive force that can uninstall governments but cannot form a replacement. Franz Fanon, conversely, presents a perspective critical of liberalism and democracy. Fanon emphasizes the importance of who is granted the benefits of individual liberty and who is burdened by state tyranny. He argues that violent revolution is inevitable when people are subjected to tyranny from the state. Arendt wrote directly in opposition to Fanon, arguing that he glorifies violence, that he exaggerates, and casts aside morality in favor of a tool that does not have the productive capacity he assumes it does. Both have the same end, liberation, but disagree on the means based on different perceptions of the utility and morality of its use. In doing so it is implicit that a liberal school of thought rejects Fanon and the use of violence as a means for achieving liberal revolution. 

Jason Brennan in his book When All Else Fails explores the moral justification for violent defense to unjust state-sanctioned violence. Brennan quotes Albert Hirschman’s thesis that in response to government, individuals can choose to exit the state's jurisdiction, voice their concerns and advocate for change, or be loyal to the current system. Polycentrism already addressed improvements in the ability to exit and voice concerns, through the greater ability to vote with one’s feet and the greater weight individuals' votes hold. The use of violent resistance may provide further improvements in protecting individual liberty. Brennan makes clear the contradiction in violence against an individual by an individual as immoral and defensive efforts against the individual as moral, yet the opposite is true as soon as the government grants that individual violator their authority. He argues that the same conditions that make it right to deceive, sabotage, and use violence against an individual apply to government as well, including assassinating murderous/warring presidents, violently resisting unjust prosecution and imprisonment, or using deadly force to stop excessive police violence. Those conditions include, a reasonable threat of harm, no better alternatives, and a proportional response to the threat. Through his work, the contradiction of those opposed to violent resistance against tyranny is clear and is reasonably compatible with the defensive morals already held by most liberals. While Brennan makes explicit that his work is not a justification for revolution, it is not hard to expand his justification toward revolutionary ends as long as the revolution is seen as a defensive response to immediate and ongoing threats of violence and rights violations

Mikayla Novak’s book Freedom in Contention (2021) offers an important assessment of the tensions between a non-violent and violent strategy for achieving liberal social change. The tensions between liberalism and violence I have outlined here are a matter of ongoing debate between social movement scholars. Novak recognizes that it is not easy to separate social movements' use of non-violent and violent means to achieve their ends. Further, some scholars have seen violent strategies as more successful than non-violent ones. Despite these findings, Novak is still critical of violent strategies but agrees more research on their effectiveness needs to take place.

Many liberal critiques of violence fail to apply the same subjective value and maximization principles used in economics and politics. If they did, they would recognize that liberation is a subjectively valued end, and like in the market, individuals will use the best available strategies to achieve it given their limited knowledge. Some may see violence as a useful tool for this purpose, while others might reject it based on their moral values. Assessing whether violence is the optimal strategy is complex, and much existing scholarship oversimplifies this issue.

Scholarship should not assume violence is inherently negative but should evaluate its potential value based on the specific context. Many oppose violence when it seems too costly or ineffective for their cause. However, the question of who benefits from liberation is crucial. A society may appear liberal to some while others face severe tyranny. The distinction lies in whether one values liberty for everyone or just for a specific group. It is not irrational for those oppressed to prefer liberation, even if it involves violence, over maintaining a tyrannical system.

Mathematical assessments of violent resistance have flaws. Buchanan, citing Tullock, dismissed revolutionary violence due to high costs and alignment challenges. However, Tullock overlooks that revolutionary success might depend on a tipping point where increased participation drastically boosts success chances. He also assumes that resistance costs are new, rather than comparable to or worse than the current suffering his model should assume under a “vicious” and “oppressive” government. While Tullock admits his work isn't conclusive, Buchanan treats it as a definitive rejection of violent revolution for liberal goals.

Some assessments suggest that violence might alienate the general population therefore non-violence should be used. This assumes that these people would support the oppressed if violence were not used and overlooks the possibility that violence might be necessary to make the status quo costlier for the oppressors than change. Additionally, the argument could apply to state violence strengthening the revolutionary movement by creating martyrs and boosting morale.

My position is not that violence should be the primary method for enacting change but that it must remain a viable option when strategically necessary to achieve liberal goals. More theoretical work by liberal scholars is needed to understand and recognize the potential value of violence, beyond their aversion to it and perceived contradictions with individual liberty. While I have not resolved when violence should or should not be used, or how to ensure it enhances rather than diminishes liberalism, It is clear violence can be a legitimate tool for achieving liberal ends and is not inherently opposed to liberal values. Those suffering under tyranny have a rational incentive to resist, and violence remains a justifiable option.

Conclusion:

While liberalism in the United States has been the greatest attempt so far at finding the proper balance between government power and individual autonomy its weaknesses have become increasingly prominent. Public choice theory scholarship makes clear the structures in our system that lead to the failure of the Constitution's checks and balances to constrain government power from going beyond its proper limited role and infringing on individual liberty. The polycentric scholarship addresses the problems in past liberal theory that can better practices in the future by making clear, through analysis of case studies, how we can decentralize our governing institutions and align incentives towards maximizing freedoms and prosperity. Furthermore, liberal moral theorizing must align with our economic and political theorizing. Coming to a culture of subjective morality is not only more consistent theoretically, it has important practical implications for how individuals would operate and want their institutions structured. Finally, liberal theory must reemphasize and reexamine the role of necessary political violence as a means for social change and maximizing liberal ends. Following those three recommendations, Buchanan's Balance will be achieved.

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